1 (Case called)

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THE CLERK: Counsel, please state your names for the record.

MS. KOVNER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Rachel Kovner and Alexander Wilson for the government.

MR. DRATEL: Good afternoon, your Honor. Joshua Dratel and Lindsay Lewis for the defendant.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. The defendant is present. Please be seated in the courtroom.

I have called you in for a decision on the pending motion to determine the mental competency of the defendant to stand trial. We had a two-day fact hearing on this, and I have thought long and hard about it and analyzed all the information that I have on the hearing, including the reports and transcript.

I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Bejaoui is competent to stand trial, he can understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding against him, and has the ability to assist properly in his defense. I am going to read a decision into the record so you will have that in full measure. My decision is as follows.

On January 24, 2011, Bejaoui's counsel requested that the Court appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate his mental competence to stand trial on the grounds that there was reasonable cause to believe, in defense counsel's opinion,

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that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him mentally incompetent to the extent that he was unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241(a).

Richard Krueger, MD, evaluated the defendant's competence for the defense. Sean J. Hannell, a Ph.D, evaluated his competence for the government on the basis of those experts' opinions. I concluded on October 7, 2011, that the defendant suffered from such a mental disease or defect, and I committed him to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for that entity to assess whether the defendant was likely to be restored to competence, which is the procedure under 18 U.S.C.

The Bureau of Prisons transferred Mr. Bejaoui from federal medical center at Devens to federal medical center in Butner, North Carolina, for purposes of determining whether he was likely to be restored to competency. In March the board certified forensic psychologist Robert E. Cochrane, director of psychology training at Butner, and board certified forensic psychiatrist Byron Herbel concluded that the defendant was in fact competent and had been malingering, that is, intentionally displaying or exaggerating symptoms of mental illness.

Following the Butner report, the defense had the defendant examined by his own expert, board certified psychiatrist Michael First, professor of clinical Columbia

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College of Physicians and Surgeons. Dr. First concluded that the professionals at Butner had misjudged Bejaoui's condition and that Bejaoui did in fact lack the competence to stand trial. He concluded that the defendant had major depression with psychotic features and that this impaired his ability to be competent. That is, he concluded he was not competent to stand trial.

On August 13 and 14 of this year, the Court held a fact hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4247(d) at which Dr. Cochrane testified for the prosecution and Dr. First testified for the defense. Each doctor was cross-examined extensively by the opposing party's attorney.

I received in evidence each expert report and all prior psychological and psychiatric evaluations of the defendant as well as transcripts and recordings of phonecalls that Mr. Bejaoui made while incarcerated. You will see that those phonecalls do play a not insignificant role in my thinking on this matter.

The standard for my determination is rather straightforward: That whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial is a matter of constitutional importance. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996).

"A defendant may not be put to trial unless he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as

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well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."

That is from Cooper at 354.

Nonetheless, "It is well established that some degree of mental illness cannot be equated with incompetence to stand trial." <u>United States v. Vamos</u>, 797 F.2d 1146-1150 (2d Cir. 1998).

Before declaring the defendant incompetent to stand trial, the test is that I must find "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." That is section 4241(d). See also United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 1995). I have already told the parties that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the conclusion that Mr. Bejaoui is incompetent to stand trial.

Both the government expert Cochrane and the defense expert First diagnosed Bejaoui with mental disorders, Cochrane implying that he had adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood as well as histrionic personality features.

That's the Cochrane report Government Exhibit 122.

Dr. First agreed to a certain extent insofar as he opined that the defendant suffered from major depressive disorder with psychotic features and undifferentiated

somatoform disorder as well as personality disorder NOS with histrionic and schizotypal features. Those are quotes from the First report, which is Government Exhibit 4 at page 15.

My task is not to determine whether or not the defendant is a picture of mental health. It is to determine whether he is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders him incompetent insofar as he could not understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding or to assist in his defense within the constraints of 4241(d). I conclude, as I have said, that Bejaoui is not thus disabled.

The hearing focused on the apparent disconnect between the symptoms of psychosis, paranoia, and dementia at times demonstrated by the defendant in the presence of his physicians and his attorneys on the one hand and, on the other hand, what both sides concede is a markedly improved mental capacity when he speaks with his wife or friend by telephone on the other hand.

Dr. First agreed that Bejaoui had displayed "striking discordance" in cognitive function depending on the setting.

Hearing transcript of August 13th at 49. The government expert, Cochrane, phrased it that Bejaoui had intentionally misled his examiners by "malingering symptomatologies of schizophrenia." August 13 transcript at 155.

Both experts appear to agree that the defendant misrepresented the extent of his symptoms, but they do disagree

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over whether Bejaoui's conduct lies within his control or is beyond it. The government expert felt, obviously, it was within his control and he was malingering, and the defense expert thought that it was not within his control and was part of a major depressive disorder with psychotic features.

Based on those experts' opinions and on the recordings of the phonecalls and the other evidence, as I said, I conclude that he is not incompetent to stand trial, that is, he is competent to stand trial.

Dr. First's analysis was well articulated, it was thoughtful. The bona fides of any of these experts is not at all at issue. But the First analysis, in the view of the Court, does not satisfactorily account for the demonstrated behavior of the defendant on all occasions, and in fact First conceded that that was true. August 14 transcript 139 to 140.

The preponderance of the evidence does not support

First's view that Bejaoui is unable to understand these

proceedings or to assist his attorney. The preponderance of

the evidence does indicate that Bejaoui does understand the

proceedings but is unwilling to assist his attorneys, in part

an expression of what both sides view as a histrionic difficult

personality. That is described by both of the expert

witnesses.

As I have said, both parties agree that the defendant displays manifestly inconsistent behavior depending upon the

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setting. These inconsistencies include the physical. The staff at Butner observed that "he was able to ambulate and did not need a wheelchair," Government Exhibit 1 at 8, "but he nevertheless insists on using one."

Bejaoui appeared almost catatonic -- that is my term as a layman, I don't purport to use that term as an expert -- in the courtroom during the competency hearing. He simply stared ahead. He wasn't immobile, but he would stare either straight ahead or down. To my knowledge, he was not saying anything during that hearing and he did not appear to be focusing on what the testimony was. Nonetheless, it is uncontradicted in the record that at Butner he was "very animated most of the time." August 13 transcript at 164.

Those are physical inconsistencies.

The inconsistencies also include the mental. The defendant reports that he does not remember his birth date and incorrectly estimates his own age. That's in the tests that were done by the expert. But neither expert states that these symptoms have a medical explanation. August 13 transcript at 79-80, 160-163, and 180-181. Bejaoui erred widely when Dr. First asked him what the current date was, but he made no such error when he was speaking to his wife on the telephone. August 13 transcript at 89.

Bejaoui expressed strikingly disorganized thoughts to his examiners, but when he wanted something from the medical

personnel, such as access to a notary, he became intelligible to such a degree that he dealt directly with a notary, told him where to sign the document at, and even pointed out to her that the power of attorney granted the power solely over his financial affairs. Hearing transcript of August 13th at 178. For whatever it's worth, the notary, who did not testify, did not notice anything that was "wrong" with him and thought he was "fairly organized." August 13 transcript at 179.

The list of differences in what he was doing that I just gave is not exhaustive. The hearing showed other inconsistent and medically inexplicable behavior, such as reporting debilitating back pain but at the same time refusing diagnostic imaging that might aid in his relief. Government Exhibit A at 16.

Similarly, he had an "exaggerated" hand tremor in the view of the medical observer when he was talking with the Butner staff, but he had no tremor when he did not deal with the staff. Government Exhibit A at 17. Similarly, he professed fears that the staff at Butner would poison him, but he accepted food, drink, and medicines from the staff. August 13 hearing at 181.

Thus, the Court concludes that the defendant has a much greater capacity in private than he demonstrates in public. Even Dr. First acknowledged that "when it is someone Bejaoui trusts, like his wife or his friend Riatt, he clearly

is able to show that he knows what is going on," August 13 at 89 to 90, and that Bejaoui "is not being honest in how he performs when you do diagnostic testing." August 14 transcript at 146.

that he is able to digest complex issues. For example, he discussed immigration paperwork with his friend and even referred to particular government forms by their form number. August 14 transcript at 22 to 23 and Government Exhibit 31. He and his friend discussed then-current events in Libya, Tunisia, and Syria. That is the same transcript reference. His ability to navigate these topics in a relaxed setting reflects the capacity for higher-order thinking that can just as readily be utilized to assist his attorneys in his defense.

Dr. First does contend that "there is a real cognitive impairment" lurking beneath his symptoms, that is, Bejaoui's symptoms, which the doctor concedes are exaggerated. August 14 transcript at 149. Dr. First centers his conclusion on, among other things, Bejaoui's "pauses" and "memory problems" that occurred even during conversations with his wife.

The Court accepts that Bejaoui exhibits some degree of paranoia -- again, that is a layman's use of the term -- as well as confusion. The symptoms, however, did not permit me to conclude that Bejaoui is "unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him." This is

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especially true in light of high functioning behavior the defendant demonstrates on his telephone calls.

The Court agrees with Dr. Cochrane that the phonecalls reveal that Bejaoui "can be organized, coherent, and can communicate information." August 14th at 23. I credit the Cochrane conclusion that the defendant "suffers from distress" -- again, nobody seems to dispute that -- but that "he does not suffer from significant mental illness, symptoms of which would interfere with his competency." August 14 at 18.

I do not mean to state that I accept Dr. Cochrane's opinions without reservation. I do not. For example, the record note made by one of Dr. Cochrane's colleagues shortly after the defendant's arrival at FMC Butner states that Cochrane had already "concluded Bejaoui was an unreliable historian, was somatizing and/or malingering other clinical presentations and was feigning psychosis." August 14 transcript at 80. Dr. Cochrane's rapidly developed conclusion certainly suggests that he had a preconceived view regarding Bejaoui's condition.

But Cochrane explained on the stand that he had not at that time reached a "firm conclusion" about Bejaoui's condition, that the notes reflected his preliminary hypothesis. August 14 transcript at 80. I accept that explanation. And the evidence at the hearing revealed that in fact Cochrane and

others conducted further evaluation of Bejaoui, that he did not base his conclusion solely on his earliest impressions.

He also incorporated the views of professional staff members that were assisting. In fact, the final report that concludes that Mr. Bejaoui was competent and was malingering was co-signed by Dr. Herbal, not only by Dr. Cochrane.

So I do conclude that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him. I also believe that he is able to assist in his defense.

The experts disagreed about whether Bejaoui had the capacity to assist in his own defense. First opined that Dr. Bejaoui's "ability to work with his attorneys in any reasonable way is compromised due to his paranoia, his depression, and his personality." August 14th at 141. That is, his mental state prevents him from communicating with his lawyers as clearly and as cogently as he obviously communicates with his wife. I should also mention that the telephone calls reflect a very loving relationship between Mr. Bejaoui and his wife, which is all to the good.

By contrast, Dr. Cochrane hypothesizes that Bejaoui's difficult relationship with his attorneys, which this Court has observed first-hand, especially early on in the litigation, in regard to his prior attorneys and the difficulties he was having with them, some of those difficulties set forth in apparent disagreements in open court with his attorney,

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reflects his "histrionic personality" which "could make interactions difficult with counsel, but it is thought to be to a large extent volitional and within one's control." That's Cochrane explaining the histrionic personality, and that is on August 13th at 167.

As I said before, both experts conclude that the defendant is a difficult personality. They disagree over the voluntariness of his behavior.

I cannot conclude that the defendant is unable to assist in his defense.

Again I turn to the telephone calls, especially the one where he coordinated with his wife about granting her power of attorney, government Exhibit 8, which is the transcript, page 3/lines 10 to 27, and the fact that he subsequently educated his wife on the effect of the power of attorney. I have already referred to that. Transcript and Government Exhibit 14 at page 2/lines 14 to 16.

On yet another occasion he instructed his wife to contact his lawyer, whom he identifies by name, to inform that lawyer that he had been mistreated. The transcript that is Government Exhibit 22 at page 4/line 33, and page 5/line 2 and page 7/lines 17 to 14. Yet later he asked his wife to tell one of his attorneys to take the statement of an intern whom Bejaoui believe witnessed the psychologist threatening him. Government Exhibit 23 at page 528 to 31.

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Again, this reflects the certain degree of paranoia the man has, but it also shows his higher order of being able to communicate and deal with legal matters and to communicate what he is thinking and what he wants.

On one of the calls his wife asked whether he had ever received a dismissal notice for his prior state case. When he said no, he told her to go to Brooklyn court to get it. That's Exhibit 14 at page 4. This line of conduct over a series of phonecalls reveals that the defendant has a significant ability to strategize in protecting and advancing his own interests even in a legal context and, when motivated, can effectively communicate his thinking and directions to others.

The Court accepts what his attorneys state, namely, that the defendant has not been assisting them in their efforts to defend him. They are quite insistent on that, and I have no reason to deny it. I further acknowledge that Bejaoui says things to them from time to time that can be characterized as fanciful. See Dr. First's report at page 12 recounting Bejaoui's express fear that his attorney is attempting to trick him into signing a confession. Nonetheless, I am unable to conclude that the defendant is unable to assist his attorneys due to depression—induced paranoia, which is the First conclusion.

I certainly hope it is clear that when I have been referring to the First conclusions, I am talking about Dr.

First throughout this. That is the transcript of August 14th at 146 to 47.

In that regard, I'm persuaded by the defendant's own words to his wife in a telephone call from Butner, and this is the transcript.

"Maria: You know, so now when the lawyer came to see you, what did he say?" That is what his wife is saying

The defendant responds: "Nothing, absolutely nothing, sweetheart. I swear to God, he didn't tell me nothing. All he was concerned about: Do I understand, do I understand. I don't have to understand anything. Are you doing the job for me or not? Then I said, you know, it's not worth it to speak to you, and then I left.

"It's not worth it, because all they have to do,

Maria, is trying to get me to a hospital in Brooklyn or

Manhattan so I can be close to my family. The further you

getting me, the more you getting me not willing to work with

him or even talk to him. That's why I prefer you talk to him."

That is the transcript at Government Exhibit 7 page 5/lines 5

to 23.

From that conversation the Court concludes that the defendant himself considers his noncooperative behavior to be a method of influencing his attorneys. That accords directly with Cochrane's theory of Bejaoui's obstinacy, more than Dr. First's theory of depression with psychotic features.

Accordingly, I cannot conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is unable to assist properly in his defense. I credit Dr. Cochrane's conclusion that Bejaoui is able to assist in his defense but refuses to do so, and I so find by a preponderance of the evidence.

In sum, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings against him and is able to assist his attorneys pursuant to 4241(d). The proceedings in this action shall move forward.

I don't know if the parties now want to discuss how to go forward. There are no other motions in the case as set forth by Mr. Dratel in a letter dated January 18, 2011. There is part of a pending motion that still exists, and it is to suppress a certain statement to the FBI, I think on the basis that no Miranda warnings were given.

Mr. Dratel, do you want to think about whether you still want to press that? I think it may have been made by a prior attorney. If you do want to press it, I'll set a date for a fact hearing and we'll set a trial date. Parties, talk to me.

MR. DRATEL: Certainly, your Honor. It makes sense to set a date so I can review and then determine whether we are going to proceed with that motion, and then to set a trial date as soon as we can, essentially, with proper preparation. It's been a long time since we looked at the merits of the case.

THE COURT: Of course. You tell me, sir. You're the defense. What would you like? I will accommodate you to the extent possible. You know I have said throughout that the concern of the Court is the amount of time this defendant has spent both in state custody, after which the charges were dropped I think on speedy trial grounds, plus this period of time which was necessitated because of the competency issues. I'd like to move this forward now that that issue has been decided. It's whatever you want, essentially.

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, I'm curious. If I could be reminded by the government in terms of how long the government anticipates its case to be?

THE COURT: Talk to me, please, because I can't hear you when you turn around.

MS. KOVNER: I'm sorry. I think we can present our case within a week, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to do it at the beginning of the year?

MR. DRATEL: That's a little late because of something that I have coming up. I have a trial in January. I have something out of town on the 11th, a sentencing that I must do, that has been delayed already, and the Court has stated she does not wish to adjourn it any further. If we could start maybe December 12th, if we could get another week, that would be good.

Cacase 1.90-cr-00553-SHS Document 65 Filed 11/07/12 Page 18 of 22 18 1 THE COURT: For the trial? 2 MR. DRATEL: Yes. 3 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, the government will proceed 4 whenever is convenient for the Court. I will note that I have 5 another trial starting December 10th, which we expect to go that day. Obviously, we are somewhat fungible, and I believe 6 7 Ms. Kovner is available. So your Honor is aware. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. I have always viewed the 9 Assistant U.S. Attorneys as totally fungible. I don't know if 10 that is good news for you or not, but that is the Court's view. 11 All right. December 12. Let's keep it a little 12 flexible because I want to talk with the jury people. I know 13 it is a little difficult to get people in around Christmas. 14 But we may be talking about December 11 instead of December 12 15 because the panels come in on Monday.

because the panels come in on Monday.

MR. DRATEL: The sentencing I have is the 11th,

unfortunately, in Chicago. I would be back the afternoon of the 11th.

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THE COURT: Let's keep it within a day or two.

MR. DRATEL: We can pick it on Monday and I can come back on Wednesday.

THE COURT: That's exactly what I was thinking. But let's keep it flexible. Right now we will say December 12th.

As we get closer, if I think it will be easier to get a jury on the 10th, I'll notify the parties. All right?

MR. DRATEL: Yes.

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THE COURT: December 12 trial, 9:30 a.m. Can the parties live with any motions in limine on November 12th? It's farther in advance than I normally would do, but I think it is appropriate. November 12th any motions in limine, proposed jury charges and, if the parties wish, proposed voir dire. I think all of you know that I essentially do my own voir dire, but I'll look at anything you want to send me. If I think it is appropriate, I'll add it to my own voir dire. If you wish, voir dire. But I do want proposed jury charges and I want any motions in limine by November 12.

I would like responses to the motions in limine, if any, on November 19th. Trial December 12, 9:30 a.m. And I'll set aside that week and the other week, the 12th through the 21st, if need be.

MR. DRATEL: For a hearing date, if necessary, for the motion, that week of the 19th is good for me, those three days before Thanksgiving, if you wanted to set aside a morning or an afternoon.

THE COURT: I'd rather do that earlier, if you can.

That can be done in October also.

MR. DRATEL: I have something that I am trying to schedule for the 29th through the 31st where I have to go to the government to interview a witness. The 2nd of November would be fine. That's a Friday, if that's OK. The problem is

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also have a Rule 15 trip out of the country from about November 5 through the following week, so it's logistically difficult.

THE COURT: Let's do it on October 30 -- you're going to be working with the government on that other trip -- if it doesn't, and I take it it may not, happen.

MR. DRATEL: It may not happen on those days, but it will happen.

THE COURT: Let's set this for October 30.

MR. DRATEL: This may not happen at all anyway.

THE COURT: Can I assume half a day or less, government?

MS. KOVNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's set it for 2 p.m. Far enough in advance so that the government can coordinate with its witnesses, let them know and let the Court know whether you need a change of that date.

MR. DRATEL: Certainly, your Honor.

THE COURT: October 30th, half a day, 2 p.m.

Anything else?

MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, we would ask that time be excluded from now until the trial date to allow preparation of the motion and preparation for trial.

MR. DRATEL: No objection, your Honor, because we have the motion possibly pending.

THE COURT: Let me put the exclusion on the record,

sir. On motion of the government, with the defense stating it has no objection, I hereby exclude time from today until December 12th from calculation pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. The exclusion is made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A).

I do make the finding that the ends of justice outweigh the interests of the public and Mr. Bejaoui in a speedy trial. The purpose is to allow the parties to prepare for a suppression hearing and for the defense to determine whether it wishes to press that issue. I take it, sir, you will let me know when you decide, if you decide not to.

MR. DRATEL: Probably within a week or ten days.

THE COURT: Good. And also to prepare for trial. The exclusion is from today until December 12th. That is an interests of justice exclusion. There also is an automatic exclusion because there is a pending motion in existence.

MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, if I recall correctly, in connection with the suppression motion there was a controversy about whether Mr. Bejaoui had in fact adopted the motion, wanted the motion to go forward. The hearing was triggered by his filing an affidavit, which I think he then disputed whether he had in fact intended to sign. I would ask that Mr. Dratel clarify in his letter to the Court whether Mr. Bejaoui was in fact adopting that motion.

THE COURT: Adopting the affidavit. I take it your

position is there is no fact underpinning sufficient to bring on a fact hearing?

MS. KOVNER: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: I forgot that, but now I do remember something about that. Mr. Dratel will be in communication with you and the Court.

MR. DRATEL: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. Also, just as a matter of preservation, I am formally objecting to the Court's decision, since we are doing it in open court, in other words, the Court's decision on the competency motion.

THE COURT: You are preserving your right to appeal.

MR. DRATEL: Right.

THE COURT: Of course. That is one of the reasons I thought it best to set my thinking out in writing and to read it so that it's clear, as clear as I can make it. You have four corners, so you will be able to effectuate your appeal rights should you believe it to be necessary.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else? Defense?

MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Government?

MS. KOVNER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all.

(Adjourned)

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